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Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of
Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinoist
William F. Duker*
When Rufus W. Peckham has been remembered at all it has
been as the author of Lochner v. New Yorkl - and even then it
is Holmes' attack on Justice Peckham's opinion: rather than the
opinion itself, that is most often recalled.' Lochner no longer
stands as a barrier to state regulation of the workday: and the
eventual failure of its underlying rationale has historically
marked the Fuller Court era.' But Lochner remains a symbol of
the concept of substantive due process.@
Justice Peckham employed the judicial philosophy embodied in Lochner for the final time in Ex parte Young,' a case in
which the Court held that the eleventh amendment and protected concepts of state sovereign immunity did not bar a federal injunction restraining a state attorney general from enforcing a state law repugnant to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. To Justice Peckham the use of a state's
name to enforce an unconstitutional law was an act without authority which did not affect the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It was "simply an illegal act upon the part of a
state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
t This is the last of three articles by the author dealing with the Fuller Court and
its impact on modem constitutional jurisprudence.
* B.A., 1976, State University of New York at Albany; Ph.D., 1978, University of
Cambridge.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Id. at 74.
3. See generally Duker, Mr. Justice R u b W. Peckham: The Police Power and the
Individual in a Changing World, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV.47.
4. Lochner was effectively overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
5. See, e-g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTFTUTIONAL
LAW 435 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Ely, Forward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HAW. L. REV.5,
15 (1978).
7. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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uncon~titutional."~
Although Lochner later haunted the Warren Court: Young
provided a useful mechanism for effectuating that Court's civil
rights campaign.1° In Dombrowski v. Pfister,ll for instance, the
Court relied on the Young doctrine to enjoin Louisiana officials
from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute members of the
Southern Conference Educational Fund for violations of the
state's Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and
the Communist Propaganda Control Law. Federal injunctive relief was appropriate, the Court reasoned, to prevent the substantial loss or impairment of freedom of expression that would result if the appellants were forced to await state court
disposition.l 2
In Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board,lS the
Warren Court relied upon Young as authority to uphold the
power of a federal district court to enjoin county officials from
paying tuition grants or giving tax exemptions to racially segregated private schools so long as the county public schools remained closed.14 The Court granted relief exceeding Young's
simple injunction by holding that the district court could require
county officials to exercise their taxing powers to levy taxes adequate to reopen, operate and maintain an integrated public
school system.'"
Because the modern civil rights injunction properly can be
traced to Ex parte Young,16 an inquiry into what lay behind
Justice Peckham's opinion in that case is not simply of historical
interest but of modern relevance as well. The search for Justice
Peckham's foundation in Young actually takes us back through
the rate-regulation cases to Munn v. Illinois,17 since Peckham's
objective in Young was to "Lochnerize" Munn. Justice Peckham
8. Id. at 159.
9. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAGEL.J.
920,935-39 (1973). See also Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 SUP.CT. REV. 261, 277-78.
10. Ex parte Young permitted "the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to
serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to
protect." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
11. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALEL.J. 1103 (1977).
12. 380 U.S. at 490-92.
13. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
14. Id. at 232.
15. Id. at 233.
16. 0. Rss, THE CIVILRIGHTSINJUNCTION 3 (1978).
17. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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actually attempted to direct a Fuller Court assault on Munn
while he was still a judge on the New York Court of Appeals,
but it was only after his appointment to the Supreme Court that
he was able to lead the Court to Munn's Achilles' heel. Munn
, ~ ~the ability of state legislatures
was not officially o v e r r ~ l e dbut
to regulate rates was circumscribed by ultimate judicial authority to determine whether the rates constituted a deprivation of
property without due process of law. Thus, even though Young
is commonly studied today as a case pitting the federal judiciary
against the state courts,19 the case, like Lochner, was actually a
confrontation between the respective powers of state legislatures
and the federal judiciary.

11. T w o VIEWS OF Ex parte Young

Ex parte Younga0came before the United States Supreme
Court on an application for leave to file a petition for writs of
habeas corpus and certiorari on behalf of Minnesota's attorney
general, Edward T. Young. Young had been imprisoned for contempt by the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Minnesota after failing to obey an injunction issued by the circuit court restraining the operation of the railroad rate regulations prescribed by the state legislature and the state railroad
commission. The injunction had originally been sought by stockholders of the railroad who claimed that the prescribed rates
were confiscatory and that the penalty provisions of the statute"
prevented the company from resorting to the courts to test its
validity. Young challenged the circuit court's jurisdiction on the
theory that he was acting on behalf of the state, which was in
turn immune from suit under the eleventh amendmentoaa
18. See, e.g., Weema Steamboat Co. v. People's Steamboat Co., 214 U.S. 345 (1909).
Justice Peckham there distinguished Munn from a case where a steamboat company
claimed the right to use another steamboat company's private wharf against the latter
company's will upon payment of reasonable compensation. The wharf was the only one
available, was located at the terminus of a public highway, and was open on occasion to
public use. Peckham nevertheless sidestepped Munn by finding no dedication to the
public and no acceptance of dedication by public authority. Id. at 356.
19. See P. BATOR,P. MISHKIN,D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER,
HART& WECHSLER'S
THEFEDERAL
COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL
SYBTBM
933-36(2d ed. 1973).
20. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21. The statute provided that any oacer, agent or employee of a railroad company
who caused, counseled, adviaed or assisted a company to violate the regulation could be
punished by imprisonment for a period of ninety days for each offense. 1907 Minn. Laws,
ch. 232, g 6.
22. 209 US. at 134-39.
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Writing for the entire Court except Justice Harlan, Justice
Peckham began his opinion by acknowledging the importance of
the case because it involved the "delicate matter" of federalstate court relations. Justice Peckham also admitted that intelligent men may differ as to the correct answers to the questions
the Court was called upon to decide." He then held that, without regard to the sufficiency of the rates in issue, the regulations
were on their face unconstitutional because they effectively
blocked resort to the courts, thereby establishing the decision of
the legislature and the railroad commission as conclusive on the
issue of the sufficiency of the rates:
[Wlhen the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous
and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and
its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of
the legislation, the result is the same as if the law in terms
prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of
laws which deeply affect its rightsp4

Peckham regretted the clash between the federal and state
courts but considered the exercise of power by the federal judiciary as an essential limitation upon state legislature^.^^
Having found the challenged rates act unconstitutional,
Peckham proceeded to consider whether there was an equitable
remedy available in the federal courts. If the suit was in fact one
against the State of Minnesota and if the injunction issued
against the state attorney general prohibited state action to enforce obedience to valid state law, the eleventh amendment
would operate as a bar to federal court access.26Since Justice
Peckham did not understand the fourteenth amendment to have
limited the sovereign immunity provided by the earlier amendment," the federal circuit court's exercise of power could be up23. Id. at 142.
24. Id. at 147. Justice Peckham re-ed
this doctrine in Willcox v. Consolidated
Gas CO., 212 U.S.19, 53-54 (1909).
25. Young was thus not only a direct ancestor of the Warren Court's Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), it was an ancestor with strikingly similar features. Both
Young and Dombrowski required federal judicial interference with state court proceedings to prevent irreparable injury. In neither case, however, was the true purpose of federal judicial intervention to interfere with the decisions or rulings of state courts. Rather,
the Court aimed at protecting substantive rights placed in jeopardy by state legislatures
and enforcement officials.
26. For the history of the eleventh amendment, see C. JACOBS,
THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENTAND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
(1972); Field, The Eleventh Amendment a d
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U . PA. L. REV.515 (1978).
27. 209 U.S. at 150.
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held only by finding an exception to the rule that a federal court
of equity had no jurisdiction to enjoin state criminal proceedings. After Justice Peckham exhaustively examined the precedents - for him an unusual approachw - he determined
that individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with
some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the
State, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from
such action?

Justice Harlan stood alone in viewing the case as a federal
court infringement upon the rightful place of state courts rather
than as a matter of judicial limitation on legislative power. "Too
little consequence," said Harlan, "has been attached to the fact
that the courts of the States are under an obligation equally
strong with that resting upon the Courts of the Union to respect
and enforce the provisions of the Federal Constitution . . . .,,SO
The ability of the state to invoke the jurisdiction of its courts
was vital to the preservation of the federal system. Justice
Harlan warned that the "country should never be allowed to
think that the Constitution can, in any case, be evaded or
amended by mere judicial interpretation, or that its behests may
be nullified by an ingenious construction of its provision^."^^
Justice Harlan agreed with Justice Peckham that the fourteenth amendment had not amended or otherwise limited the
eleventh.aa However, with not a little embarrassment, having
earlier in his judicial career written a dissenting opinion coming
close to Peckham's opinion in Young,s8 Harlan read the precedents to allow the barrier to suits against states to be surmounted only when the state officials, acting pursuant to an un28. See Pratt, Rhetorical Styles on the Fuller Court, 24 AM.J.L. HIST. 189 (1980).
Peckham cited fewer precedents than any other member of the Fuller Court. He cited an
average of 1.34 cases per page, compared with Holrnes' 3.35 page average and a Court
page average of 1.91. Although the citing of cases does not lack ambiguity, and is therefore not very helpful in labeling a judge as a formalist or an instrumentalist, it is quite
interesting to note that when Peckham had precedent on his side, he was not loath to
use it.
29. 209 U.S. at 155-56.
30. Id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Id: at 183.
32. Id. at 182.
33. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 510 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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constitutional state act, were committing or about to commit
"some specific wrong or trespass to the injury of the plaintiffs
right^."'^ Young was not such a case. Relief was not sought
against Young individually but rather against him in his capacity as attorney general, with the object of blocking Minnesota
from testing the constitutionality of its regulations in its own
courts. The proper remedy, noted Harlan, was by writ of error
from the highest court of the state to the United States Supreme
Court for redress of every constitutional right denied by the
state court? Peckham replied that if the statute was unconstitutional, it lacked the authority of, and therefore did not affect,
the state in its sovereign capacity.s6 To await the proceedings in
the state court would place the railroad company in peril of
large financial loss and its officers in great risk of fine and impri~onment?~
While Harlan rejected the power of the circuit
court to issue the injunction, he answered Peckham by arguing
that the company and its officers were not placed in peril because the circuit court injunction in effect prohibited the company from obeying the state law?
Young was not an easy case for either Peckham or Harlan.
Harlan had to confess the error of an earlier dissent and overlook what was at least his own dicta in an earlier opinion of the
Court. Peckham not only had to climb to a point never before
reached by the Court, but he had to do so on a line tied to a
legal fiction.

Justice Peckham's rejection of the idea that the fourteenth
amendment limited the eleventh forced resort to the legal fiction
that although a state could not be sued, an action could be
brought in federal court against a state officer attempting to enforce an unconstitutional state statute. The fiction brought to
fruition a seed planted by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn
34. 209 U.S. at 169, 192 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 176. This view conformed to that expressed by Harlan in cases challenging
systematic exclusion of Blacks from grand and petit juries, where Haria. had the support of the majority of the Court. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (removal
petition denied); Andsews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895) (habeas petition denied); In re
Woods,140 U.S. 278 (1891) (habeas petition denied).
36. 209 U.S. at 159.
37. Id. at 165.
38. Id. at 178 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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v. Bank of the United States.s@Unlike Osborn and the other
early eleventh amendment cases, Young involved a constitutional claim based upon a provision adopted after the eleventh
amendment - a provision which, to make the fiction a farce,
regulated state action. Justice Peckham did not spend any time
distinguishing due process from contract clause cases, nor did he
worry about the paradox presented by separating the actions of
state officers from those of the state in a due process claim case;
after all, earlier cases had already (uncritically) accepted the
paradox. Given the prevailing understanding of federa1ism:O the
fiction can be understood as an attempt to placate the states,
whose statutes were being invalidated under substantive due
process at the same time they were being assured that the fourteenth amendment had not dramatically altered the relationship
between state and federal governments.'l In other words, the
legal fiction was designed to temper the strain between substantive due process and the prevailing understanding of the privileges and immunities, due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
The privileges and immunities:.
due pro~ess:~and equal
all
understood
to insure equal treatprotection4' clauses were
ment before the laws. A similar understanding of these clauses
upholddirected the Court's responses in Plessey v. Ferg~son,'~
ing a state statute providing "separate but equal" accommodations for black and white train passengers, and in Patterson v.
Colorado," rejecting an attempt to incorporate first amendment
rights into the fourteenth amendment. Substantive due process
was a natural outgrowth of the equality of treatment interpretation: The Fuller Court, led by Mr. Justice Peckham, took one
step back from the clauses of the fourteenth amendment and
required that state legislatures assume a neutral position in en39. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,857 (1824). Cf. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828) (nominal party found not to be the real party).
40. See Duker, Rose u. Mitchell and Justice Lewis Powell: The Role of Federal
Courts and Federal Habeas, 23 How. L.J. 279,288-92 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Duker,
Rose u. Mitchell).
41. See Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,
1978 SUP.CT. REV.39, 48.
42. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)36 (1873).
43. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
44. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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acting legi~lation.~'
Legislation that discriminated against a particular economic class was presumptively void. But however natural an outgrowth, substantive due process, unlike the clauses
from which it grew, as then understood, had a profound impact
on federal-state relations.
Rate regulation, like restrictions on "liberty of contract,"
was a response by the elected branches to changing economic
conditions. Unlike criminal law it was not part of the established
role of the legislature and violated the neutrality demanded by
substantive due process. Substantive due process had emerged
as a counterpart to federalism - federalism limiting federal government, substantive due process limiting state government.
The Supreme Court would interfere with state process only
when state legislation violated the Court's "neutral principles."
Those who authored the Constitution feared a powerful central government and that fear continued to influence constitutional law throughout the nineteenth century. But, with the victory of the progressives and the decline of substantive due
process as a means of limiting state governments, federalism
weakened as a check on the national government. The traditional nineteenth century notion of federalism only interfered
with the new bulwarks of liberty, the process-oriented rights of
the Bill of Rights. By gradually expanding these rights, the Supreme Court sought to accommodate the spirit of limited government that prevailed in the age of substantive due process and
yet to acknowledge the idea of democracy that brought that age
to an end. That Justice Peckham's legal fiction was never discarded during this development attests to its total circumvention of the eleventh amendment.

IV.

THEFULLERCOURT,RATEREGULATION
AND
OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

THE

PROBLEM

Finding that "when property is devoted to public use, it is
subject to public regulation," the Court in Munn u. Illinois held
that the state legislature could regulate the rates charged by
grain elevators and that the legislature's decision was conclusive
and not subject to judicial review." In the other Granger Cases
accompanying Munn to the Supreme Court, a wide range of rail47. Duker, Peckham, supra note 3.
48. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
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road regulation was approved.'@ Mr. Justice Field charged the
Court with subverting the rights of private property, arguing
that only where some right or privilege was conferred by the
government was the compensation one received for his property
a legitimate matter of regulation." In the minds of Mr. Chief
Justice Waite and the majority, however, adequate remedy was
available at the polls if the legislature abused its power.s1
The Fuller Court's first major assault on Munn came in
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. M i n n e s ~ t a .The
~~
Minnesota legislature had delegated power to a commission to
set railroad rates in the state;5s the state supreme court subsequently ruled that the rates established were not subject to judicial review." The United States Supreme Court voted six to
three to reverse, finding that the statute deprived the company
of its due process right to a judicial investigation."" Justice
Blatchford wrote:
The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for
transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the
element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as
regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. If
the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable
rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes
place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery,
it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in
substance and effect, of the property itself, without due process
of law. . . .MI

No longer were rates made conclusive by the decision of a state
legislature or commission. Due process demanded judicial
oversight.
Justice Bradley contended that the majority "practically
49. Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877); Winona & St. P.R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S.
180 (1877); Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Peik v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877).
50. 94 U.S. at 136, 146 (Field, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 134.
52. 134 U.S. 418 (1890). See also, Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307
(1886). "This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the
equivalent of confiscation." Id. at 331.
53. 1887 Minn. Laws, ch. 10, 5 8.
54. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 38
Minn. 281, 37 N.W. 782 (1888).
55. 134 U.S. at 457.
56. Id. at 458.
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overrule[d] Munn v. Illinois," and that the question of rates was
a legislative one." For Bradley, due process of law did not require a judicial forum. Final power must rest somewhere, and in
this case Minnesota had entrusted that power to the legislature
or to the commission established by the legislature. Only where
the legislature or commission acted arbitrarily or fraudulently
could judicial relief be invoked. In all other cases, the remedy
lay with the people.68
The opportunity to test whether Munn had, in fact, been
overruled, was within the Court's reach? Three months before
the Supreme Court heard arguments in the Minnesota rate case,
the New York Court of Appeals resisted Judge Rufus Peckham's
attempt to disregard Munn and invalidate state statutes regulating the price charged by grain elevators.60The New York high
court found the business of elevating grain to be "peculiarly affect[ed]
with a public interestss6land declared, as had Justices Waite and Bradley, that the remedy for illegitimate uses of
the police power was to be found a t the polls."
Justice Peckham's dissent in the New York court's decision
reexamined the authorities relied upon by Waite in Munn and
concluded that they did not justify the decision." Peckham asserted that the legislature had no power to limit the compensation that an individual might receive for the use of his own
property which was neither devoted to a public use nor endowed
with special privileges from the state. The democratic remedy
was not only insacient, it was invalid. The majority opinion,
charged Peckham, would have government become the seat of
class conflict:

...

To uphold legislation of this character is to provide the most
frequent opportunity for arraying class against class; and, in
57. Id. at 461 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 466.
59. Although Bradley may have thought Munn to be "practically overruled," Harlan
did not. Nevertheless, Harlan was aware that other members of the Court would continue their efforts to see Munn discarded. In a September 8,1891 letter to Fuller, Harlan
wrote: "[Justice] Brewer is here, looking well. But Munn v. Illinois is still in force, ready
to do battle against all the Romans,however able or noble." (Fuller Court letters on file
in the Yale Law Library).
60. People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 670, 78 N.Y.S. App. 185 (1889).
61. Id. at 22, 22 N.E. at 677, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 192.
62. Id. at 29, 22 N.E. at 680, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 195.
63. Id. at 40, 22 N.E. at 685-86, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 200 (Peckham, J., dissenting)
(dissenting opinion incorporated into People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. at 34-71,78 N.Y.S. App.
at 197-210).
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addition to the ordinary competition that exists throughout all
industries, a new competition will be introduced, that of competition for the possession of government, so that legislative
aid may be given to the class in possession thereof in its contest with rival classes or interests in all sections and comers of
the industrial world?

In Budd u. New Y o r k y Justice Blatchford again wrote for
the majority of the Supreme Court and denied that he had earlier signaled the demise of Munn. He argued that what was said
in the Minnesota case had no reference to a case where rates
Judiwere not set by a commission but by the legislature itself.@@
cial intervention was required in the earlier case only to insure
that the commission acted within the bounds of its delegated
power.@' Justice Brewer's response for the minority was a condensed version of Peckham's thirty-six page dissent from the
state court's opinion. Like Peckham, Brewer found the paternal
theory of government "odious" and observed that "[tlhe utmost
possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his property, [was] both the limitation and duty
of go~ernment."~~
When the opportunity next arose to overrule Munn, in
Brass v. North Dakota/@three of the Justices who were tied to
the case had been replaced.'O If the Budd minority could attract
the support of two of the new Court members, Justice Brewer
could now write for the majority. Justices White and Jackson
were persuaded to join Brewer; however, Justice Brown, a mem64. Id. at 68-69, 22 N.E. at 694, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 209 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
65. 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
66. Id. at 546-47.
67. Compare Justice Blatchford's reasoning with Peckham's approach to cases involving the claim that the commission exceeded its delegated power or the claim that the
rates established were confiscatory. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
Peckham's opinion in Siler rivals his opinion in Young in its importance to federal jurisdiction. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1(1976). The rate regulation involved in Siler
was not only contested on federal grounds (alleged to be confiscatory and to interfere
with interstate commerce) but on state grounds as well (commission action challenged as
exceeding statutory authority). Finding the federal question not merely colorable or
fraudulently set up for the mere purpose of endeavoring to give the federal courts jurisdiction, Peckham observed that the federal question ought to be avoided and the case
decided upon the determination that the action of the state commission was ultra vires,
even though there was no construction of the state statute by the state's high court.
68. 143 US. at 551 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
69. 153 U.S. 391 (1894).
70. Samuel Blatchford, Lucius Q. Lamar and Joseph P. Bradley were replaced by
Edward Douglas White, Howell Edmunds Jackson and George Shiras.
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ber of the Budd minority, was reluctant to overrule Munn on a
bare majority vote. Although disappointed with the outcome of
Brass v. North D ~ k o t a , ~Brewer
'
was given the opportunity to
reaffirm the principle of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota7= in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust C O . ~ ~
In Reagan the Court enjoined the enforcement of railroad rates
set by a state railroad commission. Because the case was an equitable action commenced by the trustee of a railroad company
against both the state attorney general and members of the state
railroad commission, a new issue was injected into the rate-regulation debate: Was the suit one against the state and therefore
barred by sovereign immunity?
Prior to Reagan, suits against state officers who asserted
sovereign immunity involved claims brought under the contract
clause of the Con~titution:~rather than under the due process
clause of the fouteenth amendment. In deciding those cases, the
Waite Court initially bound itself by a rigid interpretation of the
nominal party rule articulated byeMarshallin Osborn v. Bank of
the United S t ~ t e s , ?but
~ later began to look beyond the named
parties and to question whether the state was an indispensable
party.76 In cases questioning the extent to which federal courts
were empowered to afford relief to creditors of southern states
that defaulted or repudiated their indebtedness, the balance
struck between state immunity and the restriction imposed by
the contract clause was precarious. It left the states unable to
seize the property of those who had tendered coupons from state
bonds in payment of taxes.77The coupon holders in turn, finding
the marketability of their coupons badly damaged, were unable
to obtain afErmative relief against the state to compel redemp71. 153 U.S.at 410 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
72. 134 U.S.418 (1890).
73. 154 US. 362 (1894).
74. See Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891);In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443
(1887);Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886);Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325 (1885);
Allen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1885);Chaflin v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1885);
White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307 (1885);Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885);
Cunningham v. Macon & B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883);New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108
U.S. 76 (1883);Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883);United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196 (1882);Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876);Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S.
(16Wall.)203 (1873).
75. 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) 738 (1824).
76. The nominal party rule made its last appearance as a controlling principle in
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
77. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S.270 (1885).
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tionla despite the fact that the coupons were constitutionally
binding obligations on the state. It was in this context that I n re
A y e r ~ perhaps
,~~
the leading nineteenth century sovereign immunity case, arose.
In order to avoid obligations under its Funding Act of 1871,
Virginia directed its attorneys to institute suits by summary
proceedings against anyone who tendered coupons in payment of
their taxes. Such taxpayers were required to submit to a default
judgment or to appear in court and plead the tender of coupons
and then affirmatively prove that the coupons tendered were not
counterfeit. The ability to prove that the coupons were genuine
was seriously impeded by a restriction against the use of expert
testimony and by a requirement that the bond from which the
coupon had been detached be produced. Compliance with this
latter requirement was practically impossible since few of the
bonds were owned by Virginia residents.
Coupon owners who had purchased coupons for resale
brought suit for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant officials were destroying the market for the coupons and that the
statutes purporting to authorize their actions were unconstitutional. The federal circuit court held for the complainants and
issued an injunction. After the order was disregarded by the
state's attorney general, the court found the attorney general
guilty of contempt and committed him to the custody of the
United States marshal. The case came before the Supreme
Court on a petition for habeas corpus.
Counsel for the petitioner, led by former United States Senator Roscoe Conkling, argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the injunctive proceeding was, in fact, a suit
against the state. The Court accepted the argument and ordered
Ayers released. The Court's rationale was that the real injury
was breach of contract and that the remedy for breach was on
the contract itself. Since only the parties to the contract were
capable of breaching it, the Court concluded that the suit in issue had to be a suit against the state." Justice Field concurred
but emphasized that he did not understand the opinion of the
Court to bar federal injunctive relief against state officers attempting to act pursuant to unconstitutional state legislation,
78. See Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
79. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
80. Id. at 503.
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that deprived one of the use of his property without due pro~ e s s .Justice
~l
Harlan, however, could see no distinction affecting
federal jurisdiction between a suit against state officers that enjoined their seizure of private property pursuant to an invalid
state statute, and a suit that enjoined them from bringing an
action ordered by the state that would result in injury to the
complainant's rights? Presumably Justice Harlan viewed the
attorney general's action in bringing the suit as an interference
with the complainant's contract rights and therefore no less tortious than the case Justice Field sought to shelter from the holding. Harlan's view of the injury was influenced by the nominal
party rule of Osborn, which, he argued, admitted of no exception? Based on reasoning contrary to his position in Young,
Harlan alone voted to deny habeas relief.
The Fuller Court reaffirmed the Ayers rule in Pennoyer v.
McConnaughyM and provided a clear distinction between suits
that were barred by sovereign immunity and those that were
maintainable. The former cases were those "where the suit is
brought against the officers of the State, as representing the
State's action and liability, thus making it, though not a party to
the record, the real party against which the judgment will so op~~
erate as to compel it to specifically perform its c ~ n t r a c t s . "The
latter cases were those "where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to act as officers of the State, and under the
color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and
injury to the rights and property of the lai in tiff."^^
The problems of sovereign immunity and rate regulation
converged in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. Before Justice Brewer could determine whether the rates set by the commission were reasonable, he had to determine whether the suit
was maintainable. Although, as Justice Harlan emphasized in
Young, the state statute establishing the commission waived
sovereign immunity, Brewer did not rely on the waiver. In reply
to the state attorney general's eleventh amendment challenge,
Brewer observed:
81. Id. at 509 (Field, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 511. Compare Harlan's position in this case with his mition in Young
and with Marshall's opinion in Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110
(1828).
84. 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id.
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So far from the State being the only real party in interest, and
upon whom alone the judgment effectively operates, it has in a
pecuniary sense no interest at all. Going back of all matters of
form, the only parties pecuniarily affected are the shippers and
the carriers, and the only direct pecuniary interest which the
State can have arises when it abandons its governmental character and, as an individual, employs the railroad company to
carry its property. There is a sense, doubtless, in which it may
be said that the State is interested in the question, but only a
governmental sense. It is interested in the well-being of its citizens, in the just and equal enforcement of all its laws; but such
governmental interest is not the pecuniary interest which
causes it to bear the burden of an adverse judgment?'

Professor Jacobs, who read Ayers to mean that "[mlere institution of state judicial proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional
regulation was not . . . a wrong for which relief should be afforded," puzzled over the result in Reagan.88 He suspected that
by differentiating between governmental and pecuniary state interests Brewer was seeking to divert attention from the more
embarrassing question of whether the suit was against the state
officer in his individual or representative capacity.8@However, it
may be that the cases provide a lesson in pleading. Contrary to
Ayers, the injury alleged in Reagan was the target of the requested injunction. Brewer's response to the state attorney general then was that the direct remedy for the injury was not
aimed at the state.@O
After passing the threshold question, Justice Brewer was
met with a challenge to the judiciary's power to inquire into the
reasonableness of the rates. While the courts were not to perform the administrative duty of framing or revising the schedule
of rates, Brewer observed that it was
within the scope of judicial power and a part of judicial duty to
restrain anything which, in the form of a regulation of rates,
operates to deny to the owners of property invested in the bus87. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. at 390.
88. JACOBS,
supra note 26, at 133-34.
89. Id. at 134.
90. Compare this rationale with the Burger Court's rejection of the structural injunction and its articulation of the tailoring principle. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977);
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,433-35 (1976);Milliken v. Bradley,
418 US. 717, 752-53 (1974); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,

15-16 (1971).
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iness of transportation that equal protection which is the constitutional right of all owners of other property."

Relying primarily on an assessment of the potential for dividends from net income after capital expenses, and with the support of the entire Court, Brewer concluded that the rates were
unreasonables2and aflirmed the circuit court's injunction.
In Smyth v. Ames," the Court r e a r m e d the judicial role
established by Mr. Justice Brewer in Reagan and upheld Circuit
Justice Brewer's injunction restraining enforcement of Nebraska's railroad rates." Justice Harlan, who spoke for a unanimous Court, dealt quickly with the eleventh amendment issue
and, though he would say otherwise in Young, held "that a suit
against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers
of a State from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the
injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the
State."@' Although acknowledging that the question of compensation was more easily determined by a commission than a
court, Harlan stated that the courts could not shrink from the
obligation of determining whether the company has been seThe state legcured the rights guaranteed by the Constituti~n.~
islature could not be the final judge of the validity of its own
enactments.@'
In determining that the rates were unreasonable,
Harlan relied on the overall reasonableness to the public as well
as to the company.
The following year, Justice Harlan again spoke for a united
Court in Fitts u. McGhee.@*But this time he reversed a circuit
court's judgment enjoining the state attorney general from instituting proceedings to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional statute that fixed tolls on a railroad bridge and from criminally
-

-

-

91. 154 U.S. at 399.
92. In two post-Young decisions, however, Peckham held that the presumption favored the validity of rates and found that the complainants in Willcox v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909), and Railroad Comm'n of La. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co.,
212 U.S. 414 (1909), failed to sustain the burden of showing beyond any fair doubt that
the rates were confiscatory.
93. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
94. Probably weary from his circuit duties, Brewer wrote Fuller that "[ilf the brethren have any doubt as to the Nebraska Maximum rate case I am quite sure I could solve
their doubts, but I do not care what becomes of the case." (n.d., Fuller Court letters on
file in the Yale Law Library).
95. 169 U.S.at 518-19.
96. Id. at 527.
97. Id.
98. 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
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prosecuting agents of the railroad company for levying rates
higher than those set. Unlike the situations in Reagan and
Smyth, the state officers in Fitts were not "specially charged"
with the execution of the allegedly unconstitutional statute. Justice Harlan observed that if injunctive proceedings were allowed
to test the constitutionality of state legislation where the state
official had no special relation to the statute,
the constitutionality of every act passed by the legislature
could be tested by a suit against the Governor and the Attorney General, based upon the theory that the former as the executive of the State was, in a general sense, charged with the
execution of all its laws, and the latter, as Attorney General,
might represent the State in litigation involving the enforcement of its statutes.g9

Unlike the state officers in Reagan and Smyth, who had attempted to conceal their wrong behind an unconstitutional state
statute, the attorney general in Fitts was not proceeding on the
authority of an allegedly unconstitutional statute but was acting
under his general power to enforce the laws.
While Harlan's analysis may have initially intrigued the
Court or perhaps escaped its careful scrutiny, it soon became apparent that if the judiciary were to retain its role in checking the
state regulatory schemes, his rigid approach would have to be
abandoned.loOIn hopes of ridding themselves of federal court
oversight, many states, including Minnesota, took advantage of
Fitts and rewrote their rate regulations - this time being careful not to impose any special enforcement duty on any officer or
agency.lo1But in Ex parte Young the Court closed the loophole.
Justice Peckham held that it made no difference whether the
state official acted pursuant to some positive law or the general
law; if he sought to enforce an unconstitutional act, he could be
enjoined by a federal court of equity.
99. Id. at 530.
100. See Prout v. S t , , 188 U.S. 537 (1903) (reafErmed Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466 (1898)). Between Prout and Young, the eleventh amendment bar was raised by a
state railroad commission and rejected by the Court, per Peckham in Mississippi R.R.
Comm'n v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 203 U.S. 335 (1906). The action of the state commission
did not concern rates, rather an order that the railroad company make stops at the town
of Magnolia, Mississippi. Peckham's decision invalidating the order relied upon the commerce clause.
101. See Scott, The Increased Control of State Activities By the Federal Courts, 3
AM. POL.SCI.REV.347, 358 (1909).

-
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V. THERESPONSE
TO Young: SANCTIONING
THE LOCHNER
COURT
The federal judiciary provided the railroads with a refuge
from the Panic of 1907. Prior to July 1, 1908, only one suit had
been filed to enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. By the end of the year, sixteen more had commenced.loa
Ex parte Young finally secured the refuge from state regulation.lo3But, as Peckham fearedlMand Harlan predicted,lo6progressive forces soon rose up in response to Young. The Nebraska
legislature, no doubt still disturbed by the Court's response in
Smyth v. Ames to the state's exercise of legislative power, demanded national legislation that would check federal judicial interference with state railroad regulation.lw Senator Crawford of
South Dakota introduced an amendment to the bill creating the
Commerce Court which prohibited the issuance of an injunction
by a federal court except after ten days notice to the governor of
the state.lo7Such a limitation would allow time for the state attorney general to file suit in a state court to enforce the state
rate regulation, and would thereby block federal court injunctive
relief under the Judiciary Act of 1793.1°8
It was the southern rather than the progressive response to
Young that prevailed, however.109 Senator Crawford's amendment was rejected and Congress accepted instead the amendment that had been suggested by Senator Bacon of Georgia
shortly after Young was decidedl10 and which was now offered
by Senator Overman of North Carolina.l1l Overman's amend102. 22 I.C.C. ANN.REP.20 (1908).
103. See the statement of Senator Overman during the debate to amend the bill
establishing the Commerce Court: "I saw in Moody's Magazine last week that there are
150 cases of this kind now where one federal judge has tied the hands of the state officers, the governor, and the attorney general . . ."45 CONG.REC.7256 (1910). See also
Warren, Federal a d State Court Interference, 43 HARV.L. REV.345 (1930).
104. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 166.
105. Id. at 183 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
THESUPREME
COURT
IN UNITED
STATES
HISTORY,
439 (1st ed.
106. See 3 C. WARREN,
1922).
107. 45 CONG.REC. 7252 (1910).
108. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, 8 5, 1 Stat. 334.
109. See 45 CONG.REc. 7252-58 (1910). See also Hutcheson, A Case for Three
Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795,798-813 (1934). The response to Young was thus similar to
the response to the liberal use of federal habeas by the lower federal courts following the
revocation of Supreme Court jurisdiction under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Duker,
Rose v. Mitchell, supra note 40, at 289.
110. 42 CONG.REc. 1665 (1908).
111. 45 CONG.REc. 7253-58 (1910).

.
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ment responded only to concerns relating to federalism and left
the Supreme Court free to protect the substantive values impaired by excess rate regulation.l12 It required the convening of
a three-judge panel where an injunction was sought against state
officials attempting to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional state
statute. It did allow a single federal judge to issue a temporary
restraining order, but only if irreparable loss to the complainant
would otherwise result. Under such circumstances the temporary
restraining order could remain in force until three judges met
"at the earliest practical day."llS Appeal from the three-judge
court was directly to the Supreme Court.l14
Although it is Roscoe Pound's 1909 attack116 on Justice
Peckham and the Lochner Court that one thinks of today as expressing the prevailing contemporary response to the judicial
philosophy embodied in Lochner and Young,the activist role assumed by the Supreme Court at the turn of the century was not
only accepted by the majoritarian branches of the national government, it was reinforced. The democratic branches conspired
with the Supreme Court in the transformation of the judicial
role. Aid from the democratic arm of government began with the
enactment of the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act in 1891,116which
cut the number of cases requiring Supreme Court attention and
increased that Court's ability to select cases offering an opportunity to identify important public values.l17 The assistance continued through the swift approval of Cleveland's nomination of
Rufus Peckham,l18 whose activist conception of the judicial role
was well known, and was further evident in the enactment of the
Three-Judge Act of 1910. While progressive forces were beginning to prevail in states such as Nebraska (Roscoe Pound and
William Jennings Bryan1l@)and Minnesota (Edward Young), by
upholding the "right to property" and "liberty of contract," the
112. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, 5 17, 36 Stat. 539.
113. Id. at 557.
114. Although the prevailing understanding of federalism rejected lower federal
court interference with state process, the Supreme Court at this time was considered to
be part of a state's process of law. See In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1893).
115. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALEL.J. 454 (1909).
116. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
117. The Court went even further and developed the requirement that federal questions be "substantial" to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. See Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308 (1902); Richardson v. Louisville & N.R.R., 169
U.S. 128 (1898); New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891).
118. Duker, Peckham, supra note 3, at 55.
119. Bryan was counsel for appellant in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. at 486.
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Court, led by Justice Rufus W. Peckham, was reflecting the substantive values of the day. The fact that the Lochner philosophy
would eventually be used to frustrate the rightful succession of
progressivism120while the Young doctrine would be relied upon
to effectuate "fundamental" principles illustrates the condemnation of Lochner and the celebration of Young, an ironic result
since Young was little more than a manifestation and implementation of the Lochner approach.

120. See e.g. Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).

